QakBot C2 Traffic

In this video I analyze network traffic from a QakBot (QBot) infection in order to identify the Command-and-Control (C2) traffic. The analyzed PCAP file is from malware-traffic-analysis.net.

IOC List

• C2 IP and port: 80.47.61.240:2222
• C2 IP and port: 185.80.53.210:443
• QakBot proxy IP and port: 23.111.114.52:65400
• JA3: 72a589da586844d7f0818ce684948eea
• JA3S: ec74a5c51106f0419184d0dd08fb05bc
• JA3S: fd4bc6cea4877646ccd62f0792ec0b62
• meieou.info X.509 cert hash: 9de2a1c39fbe1952221c4b78b8d21dc3afe53a3e
• meieou.info X.509 cert Subject OU: Hoahud Duhcuv Dampvafrog
• meieou.info X.509 cert Issuer O: Qdf Wah Uotvzke LLC.
• gifts.com X.509 cert hash: 0c7a37f55a0b0961c96412562dd0cf0b0b867d37
• HTML Body Hash: 22e5446e82b3e46da34b5ebce6de5751664fb867
• HTML Title: Welcome to CentOS

Links

• QakBot PCAP download (malware-traffic-analysis.net)
• 80.47.61.240 (VirusTotal)
• 80.47.61.240:2222 (ThreatFox)
• 80.47.61.240 (Feodo Tracker)
• 80.47.61.240 (Censys)
• 185.80.53.210 (Censys)

For more analysis of QakBot network traffic, check out my Hunting for C2 Traffic video.

Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Thursday, 02 March 2023 12:43:00 (UTC/GMT)

Tags: #QakBot​ #QBot​ #C2​ #Video​ #malware-traffic-analysis.net​ #ThreatFox​ #ec74a5c51106f0419184d0dd08fb05bc​ #fd4bc6cea4877646ccd62f0792ec0b62​ #CapLoader​ #NetworkMiner​

How to Identify IcedID Network Traffic

Brad Duncan published IcedID (Bokbot) from fake Microsoft Teams page earlier this week. In this video I take a closer look at the PCAP file in that blog post.

Note: This video was recorded in a Windows Sandbox to minimize the risk of infecting the host PC in case of accidental execution of a malicious payload from the network traffic.

As I have previously pointed out, IcedID sends beacons to the C2 server with a 5 minute interval. According to Kai Lu’s blog post A Deep Dive Into IcedID Malware: Part 2, this 5 minute interval is caused by a call to WaitForSingleObject with a millisecond timeout parameter of 0x493e0 (300,000), which is exactly 5 minutes.

The IcedID trojan uses a custom BackConnect protocol in order to interact with victim computers through VNC, a file manager or by establishing a reverse shell. There was no IcedID BackConnect traffic in this particular PCAP file though, but several other IcedID capture files published on malware-traffic-analysis.net do contain IcedID BackConnect traffic. For more information on this proprietary protocol, please see our blog post IcedID BackConnect Protocol.

IOC List

Fake Microsoft Teams download page

• URL: hxxp://microsofteamsus[.]top/en-us/teams/download-app/
• MD5: 5dae65273bf39f866a97684e8b4b1cd3
• SHA256: e365acb47c98a7761ad3012e793b6bcdea83317e9baabf225d51894cc8d9e800
• More info: urlscan.io

IcedID GzipLoader

• Filename: Setup_Win_13-02-2023_16-33-14.exe
• MD5: 7327fb493431fa390203c6003bd0512f
• SHA256: 68fcd0ef08f5710071023f45dfcbbd2f03fe02295156b4cbe711e26b38e21c00
• More info: Triage

IcedID payload disguised as fake gzip file

• URL: hxxp://alishabrindeader[.]com/
• MD5: 8e1e70f15a76c15cc9a5a7f37c283d11
• SHA256: 7eb6e8fdd19fc6b852713c19a879fe5d17e01dc0fec62fa9dec54a6bed1060e7
• More info: IcedID GZIPLOADER Analysis by Binary Defense

IcedID C2 communication

• IP and port: 192.3.76.227:443
• DNS: treylercompandium[.]com
• DNS: qonavlecher[.]com
• X.509 certificate SHA1: b523e3d33e7795de49268ce7744d7414aa37d1db
• X.509 certificate SHA256: f0416cff86ae1ecc1570cccb212f3eb0ac8068bcf9c0e3054883cbf71e0ab2fb
• JA3: a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1
• JA3S: ec74a5c51106f0419184d0dd08fb05bc
• Beacon interval: 5 minutes
• More info: ThreatFox

Network Forensics Training

Check out our upcoming live network forensics classes for more hands-on network forensic analysis. Our current class material doesn’t include any IcedID traffic though, instead you’ll get to investigate C2 traffic from Cobalt Strike, TrickBot, njRAT, Meterpreter and a few others.

Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Wednesday, 15 February 2023 10:52:00 (UTC/GMT)

Tags: #IcedID​ #CapLoader​ #Video​ #Periodicity​ #a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1​ #ec74a5c51106f0419184d0dd08fb05bc​

CapLoader 1.9.5 Alerts on Malicious Traffic

CapLoader 1.9.5 was released today!

The most important addition in the 1.9.5 release is the new Alerts tab, in which CapLoader warns about malicious network traffic such as command-and-control protocols. The alerts tab also shows information about network anomalies that often are related to malicious traffic, such as periodic connections to a particular service or long running sessions.

Other additions in this new version are:

• BPF support for “vlan” keyword, for example “vlan”, “not vlan” or “vlan 121”
• Support for nanosecond PCAP files (magic 0xa1b23c4d)
• Support for FRITZ!Box PCAP files (magic 0xa1b2cd34)
• Decapsulation of CAPWAP protocol, so that flows inside CAPWAP can be viewed and filtered on
• Domain names extracted from TLS SNI extensions

Alerts for Malicious Network Traffic

As you can see in the video at the end of this blog post, the Alert tab is a fantastic addition for everyone who wants to detect malicious activity in network traffic. Not only can it alert on over 30 different malicious command-and-control (C2) protocols — including Cerber, Gozi ISFB, IcedID, RedLine Stealer, njRAT and QakBot — it also alerts on generic behavior that is typically seen in malware traffic. Examples of such generic behavior are periodic connections to a C2 server or long running TCP connections. This type of behavioral analysis can be used to detect C2 and backdoor traffic even when the protocol is unknown. There are also signatures that detect “normal” protocols, such as HTTP, TLS or SSH running on non-standard ports as well as the reverse, where a standard port like TCP 443 is carrying a protocol that isn’t TLS.

Many of CapLoader’s alert signatures are modeled after threat hunting techniques, which can be used to detect malicious activities that traditional alerting mechanisms like antivirus, EDR’s and IDS’s might have missed. By converting the logic involved in such threat hunting tasks into signatures a great deal of the analysts’ time can be saved. In this sense part of CapLoader’s alerting mechanism is a form of automated threat hunting, which saves several steps in the process of finding malicious network traffic in a packet haystack.

Watch my Hunting for C2 Traffic video for a demonstration on the steps required to perform manual network based threat hunting without CapLoader's alerts tab. In that video I identify TLS traffic to a non-TLS port (TCP 2222) as well as non-TLS traffic to TCP port 443. As of version 1.9.5 CapLoader automatically generates alerts for that type of traffic. More specifically, the alert types will be Protocol-port mismatch (TLS on TCP 2222) and Port-protocol mismatch (non-TLS on TCP 443). Below is a screenshot of CapLoader’s new Alerts tab after having loaded the capture files analyzed in the Hunting for C2 Traffic video.

Image: Alerts for malicious traffic in CapLoader 1.9.5.

Video Demonstration of CapLoader's Alerts Tab

The best way to explain the power of CapLoader’s Alerts tab is probably by showing it in action. I have therefore recorded the following video demonstration.

The PCAP file analyzed in the video can be downloaded from here:
https://www.netresec.com/files/McDB_150724-18-22_FpF90.pcap

This capture file is a small snippet of the network traffic analyzed in one of my old network forensics classes. It contains malicious traffic from njRAT and Kovter mixed with a great deal of legitimate web traffic.

Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Thursday, 09 February 2023 14:30:00 (UTC/GMT)

Tags: #CapLoader​ #Video​ #Threat Hunting​

Hunting for C2 Traffic

In this video I look for C2 traffic by doing something I call Rinse-Repeat Threat Hunting, which is a method for removing "normal" traffic in order to look closer at what isn't normal.

The video was recorded in a Windows Sandbox in order to avoid accidentally infecting my Windows PC with malware.

The PCAP files analyzed in the video are:

• 2022-06-27-part-1-of-2-Qakbot-with-Cobalt-Strike-and-DarkVNC.pcap
• 2022-06-27-part-2-of-2-Qakbot-with-DarkVNC-and-email-banner-traffic.pcap
• 2022-06-28-TA578-IcedID-with-Cobalt-Strike-raw.pcap

Thank you for sharing these capture files Brad!

IOC List

• QBot source: 23.29.125.210
• QBot md5: 2b55988c0d236edd5ea1a631ccd37b76
• QBot sha1: 033a22c3bb2b0dd1677973e1ae6280e5466e771c
• QBot sha256: 2d68755335776e3de28fcd1757b7dcc07688b31c37205ce2324d92c2f419c6f0
• Qbot proxy protocol server: 23.111.114.52:65400
• QBot C2: 45.46.53.140:2222
• QBot C2 JA3: 51c64c77e60f3980eea90869b68c58a8
• QBot C2 JA3S : 7c02dbae662670040c7af9bd15fb7e2f
• QBot X.509 domain: thdoot.info
• QBot X.509 thumbprint: 5a8ee4be30bd5da709385940a1a6e386e66c20b6
• IcedID BackConnect server: 78.31.67.7:443
• IcedID BackConnect server: 91.238.50.80:8080

References and Links

• herALook.dat (MalwareBazaar)
• herALook.dat (VirusTotal)
• Qbot proxy protocol details (Securelist)
• QBot JA3 hash (DFIR Report)
• IcedID BackConnect protocol (Group-IB)

Update 2022-10-13

Part two of this analysis has been published: IcedID BackConnect Protocol

Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Friday, 30 September 2022 12:37:00 (UTC/GMT)

Tags: #Threat Hunting​ #PCAP​ #CapLoader​ #NetworkMiner​ #NetworkMiner Professional​ #Video​ #QBot​ #QakBot​ #51c64c77e60f3980eea90869b68c58a8​ #IcedID​ #TA578​

CapLoader 1.9.4 Released

A new version of our advanced PCAP filtering tool CapLoader was released today. The new CapLoader 1.9.4 release includes features like JA3 hash extraction from TLS traffic and a fantastic thing called Select Similar Flows, which is a unique feature that you will only find in CapLoader! We have also included a VXLAN parser, so that flows tunneled inside of overlay networks can be presented directly in the CapLoader GUI.

Select Similar Flows or Services

If you right-click a flow or service in CapLoader you’ll now be presented with an option to “select similar flows” (or services). This feature causes CapLoader to read through the loaded PCAP files again in order to find other flows that are similar to the one that was right-clicked. CapLoader doesn’t care about IP addresses or port numbers when assessing this similarity. Instead it looks at behavioral patterns in the traffic itself, such as packet sizes and byte patterns. In practice, this feature will select flows that are communicating using the same protocol as the one you clicked, regardless of which port it runs on. CapLoader already comes with an advanced feature for doing port-independent protocol identification, which currently detects over 170 protocols. But the “select similar” feature can even be used to find odd or proprietary protocols that aren’t in CapLoaders protocol database.

There is also a feature called “select VERY similar flows” which, instead of searching for flows with the same protocol, looks for flows with the same implementation or dialect of that particular protocol. This feature can be used to single out the network traffic of a particular software or tool from a haystack of network traffic from multiple applications, which all run the same application layer protocol. Another use case is to find additional malicious C2 sessions that run on top of a standard protocol like HTTP, TLS or DNS – provided that you’ve located at least one such malicious flow or service.

JA3 and JA3S Hashes for TLS Flows

We added JA3 extraction to NetworkMiner back in 2019, with the release of NetworkMiner 2.5. It’s now time to bring this useful little TLS fingerprinting feature into CapLoader as well. As of version 1.9.4 CapLoader attempts to extract JA3 and JA3S hashes from all TCP flows. The JA3 and JA3S hashes are presented in the Flows and Services tabs as separate columns. This allows users to filter flows based on a JA3 hash directly in CapLoader instead of having to export a filtered PCAP to an external tool to calculate JA3 hashes.

Image: Column criteria filter “JA3 = a72f351cf3c3cd1edb345f7dc071d813” on PCAP from CERT-SE’s 2021 CTF.

Extraction of Flows Inside of VXLAN Tunnels

VXLAN is a network virtualization technology that can be used to create overlay networks, where Ethernet frames are encapsulated inside of UDP packets (see RFC 7348). The UDP port used for VXLAN is 4789 or 8472. We added support for VXLAN to NetworkMiner in 2017, but CapLoader has until now only presented the VXLAN tunnels in the GUI when VXLAN traffic is loaded. We’re happy to announce that CapLoader now extracts flows for the VXLAN tunnels and the traffic inside of those tunnels.

Image: ICMP flow extracted from VXLAN tunnel. PCAP file is Virtual_Extensible_LAN-VXLAN.pcap from Xena Networks

Additional GUI Improvements

We’ve also made several minor improvements to CapLoader’s user interface, such as a “Save Visible Flows” option on the File menu, which can be used to save the filtered traffic in the current view to a PCAP file. Another nice addition is the “Copy from Selected Rows” menu option, which can be used to copy text from a particular column.

CapLoader’s OSINT lookup context menus have also been updated to include some very useful services like Feodo Tracker, Hatching Triage and IPVoid.

Free Trial versus Full Version

Many of the new additions to CapLoader are only available in the full version, but the VXLAN extraction and some of the GUI additions are also available in the free trial version of CapLoader. No registration is required to download the trial — just download, extract and run for 30 days. If you like it, then please consider purchasing the full version!

Updating to the Latest Release

Users who have already purchased a license for CapLoader can download a free update to version 1.9.4 from our customer portal.

Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Thursday, 16 June 2022 11:44:00 (UTC/GMT)

Tags: #CapLoader​ #JA3​ #JA3S​ #Protocol Identification​ #Protocol Detection​ #PCAP​ #TLS​ #VXLAN​

Open .ETL Files with NetworkMiner and CapLoader

Windows event tracing .etl files can now be read by NetworkMiner and CapLoader without having to first convert them to .pcap or .pcapng. The ETL support is included in NetworkMiner 2.7.2 and CapLoader 1.9.3, which were both released this morning.

What is an ETL Trace File?

ETL is short for Event Trace Log, which is ETW session data that has been logged to a file. You can, for example, extract EVTX logs from ETL files. But in this blog post we're gonna focus on network traffic that has been captured to an ETL file with a command like:

Pro-tip: You can specify a capture NIC explicitly with "CaptureInterface=<GUID>"

NetworkMiner and CapLoader can also read packets in Pktmon ETL files, which actually are different from those created with netsh. Capturing packets to an ETL file with Pktmon is very simple:

Pro-tip: You can specify capture filters with "pktmon filter add"

You can also capture packets to ETL files with PowerShell:

Pro-tip: You capture packets on a remote PC by specifying a CimSession

Advantages

The built-in support for ETL files in NetworkMiner and CapLoader makes it easy to work with ETL files. Not only will you no longer need to go through the extra step of converting the ETL file to PCAP using etl2pcapng or Microsoft Message Analyzer (which was retired in 2019), the analysis will also be faster because both CapLoader and NetworkMiner read ETL files faster compared to etl2pcapng and MMA.

Limitations

The primary limitation with NetworkMiner and CapLoader's ETL support is that it only works in Windows. This means that you will not be able to open ETL files when running NetworkMiner in Linux or macOS.

Another limitation is that both NetworkMiner and CapLoader might fail to parse logged packets if the event trace was created on an OS version with an event manifest that is incompatible with the OS version on which the ETL file is opened.

Under the Hood

Both NetworkMiner and CapLoader leverage Windows specific API calls to read packets from ETL files. An ETL file opened in CapLoader first get converted to PcapNG, then CapLoader parses that PcapNG file. NetworkMiner, on the other hand, parses the packets in the ETL file directly to extract artifacts like files, images and parameters. NetworkMiner's approach is both simpler and quicker, but by converting the ETL file to PcapNG CapLoader can utilize its packet indexing feature to rapidly extract any subset of the captured traffic upon request by the user.

CapLoader's approach is also useful for users who are wondering how to open ETL files in Wireshark, since the packets from an ETL file can be opened in Wireshark by dragging the PcapNG file from the CapLoader GUI onto Wireshark.

Additional Updates in NetworkMiner

The ETL support is not the only new feature in NetworkMiner 2.7.2 though. We have also added support for the ERSPAN protocol. The FTP parser has also been improved to support additional commands, such as AUTH (RFC2228).

We've also added a useful little feature to the context menu of the Parameter's tab, which allows users to send extracted parameters to CyberChef (on gchq.github.io) for decoding.

Additional Updates in CapLoader

The only major improvement in CapLoader 1.9.3, apart from the built-in ETL-to-PcapNG converter, is that the protocol identification speed and precision has been improved. We've also separated the identification of SSL (version 2.0 to 3.0) and TLS (SSL 3.1 and later) as two separate protocols in this version, whereas they previously both were fingerprinted as "SSL".

Credits

We'd like to thank Dick Svensson and Glenn Larsson for their input on reading ETL files. We also want to thank Markus Schewe for recommending us to add ERSPAN support to NetworkMiner!

Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Tuesday, 02 November 2021 07:15:00 (UTC/GMT)

Tags: #PowerShell​ #CapLoader​ #NetworkMiner​ #PcapNG​ #Windows​ #Wireshark​ #PCAP​ #CyberChef​

Carving Packets from Memory

Someone who says "We're gonna pull the packet captures out of the router" probably has no clue how to capture network traffic. In the Lindell case, statements like these were results of an elaborate hoax.

Nevertheless, such a statement doesn't have to be nonsense — if it comes from someone who knows how to dump the physical memory from the router. There are actually more packets available in the RAM of a router, or computer for that matter, than you might think.

The Forensic Challenge from DFRWS 2016 contains a memory dump from an SDN switch. If you drag-and-drop SDN.ram.raw from that challenge to CapLoader then you'll be asked if you wanna carve packets from the memory dump.

This packet carving feature is also available in the free trial version of CapLoader.

Clicking "Yes" in the dialogue brings up a configuration window. The default settings are okay in most cases.

After pressing "Start" CapLoader will start identifying packets in the memory dump from the SDN switch. The packets will be saved to a Pcap-NG file located in the %TEMP% directory, unless you specified a different output location in the config window.

You can download a copy of the Pcap-NG file that I generated with CapLoader 1.9.2 here:
https://www.netresec.com/files/SDN.ram.raw.pcapng (661 kB, 2959 packets)

Here's what it looks like when the carved packets have been loaded into NetworkMiner Professional.

As you can see, a great deal of information can be extracted about the hosts on this network just by examining the dumped memory from the SDN switch.

What about Bulk Extractor?

Simson Garfinkel's bulk_extractor can also extract packets from memory dumps. It was actually a research paper by Simson that inspired me to implement a packet carver in the first place.

There are a few significant differences between bulk_extractor and CapLoader with regards to packet carving though. One difference is that bulk_extractor identifies network packets by looking for Ethernet frames containing IPv4 packets, while CapLoader looks for IPv4 or IPv6 packets containing TCP or UDP packets. The output from bulk_extractor is usually quite similar to that of CapLoader, and so is the parsing speed. CapLoader was just slightly faster in our tests and carved about 3% more packets compared to bulk_extractor, these additional packets were primarily IPv6 packets and packets that weren't encapsulated by an Ethernet frame.

Where can I download memory dumps?

I posted a question on Twitter, asking the #DFIR community for their favorite publicly available memory dumps prior to writing this blog post, and I received lots of great answers. Thank you all for contributing! I have now compiled the following list of places from where you can download memory dumps:

• Memory Images from the Stolen Szechuan Sauce case by James Smith
• Digital Corpora 2018 Lone Wolf Scenario by Thomas Moore
• Digital Corpora 2009 M57 Patents Scenario by Naval Postgraduate School
• DFRWS 2005 Challenge
• DFRWS 2008 Challenge
• DFRWS 2016 Challenge (SDN switch)
• CTF-styled memory forensic challenges by Abhiram Kumar
• Mini Memory CTF contest from 2020 by 13Cubed
• Web Server Case by Ali Hadi
• Locky Ransomware infection by Jiří Vinopal
• Memory images from the Art of Memory Forensics (book) by the Volatility Team
• Memory Forensic challenges on CyberDefenders
• GrrCON 2015 CTF by Wyatt Roersma
• GrrCON 2017 Memory Dumps by Wyatt Roersma
• GrrCON 2019 CTF by Wyatt Roersma

For a more detailed blog post on CapLoader's packet carving functionality, please see our Carving Network Packets from Memory Dump Files blog post from 2014.

Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Tuesday, 31 August 2021 15:10:00 (UTC/GMT)

Tags: #Forensics​ #RAM​ #PCAP​ #Pcap-NG​ #PcapNG​ #DFIR​ #carve​ #carver​ #packets​ #dump​ #CapLoader​ #memory forensics​ #DFRWS​

Walkthrough of DFIR Madness PCAP

I recently came across a fantastic digital forensics dataset at dfirmadness.com, which was created by James Smith. There is a case called The Stolen Szechuan Sauce on this website that includes forensic artifacts like disk images, memory dumps and a PCAP file (well, pcap-ng actually). In this video I demonstrate how I analyzed the capture file case001.pcap from this case.

Follow Along in the Analysis

Please feel free to follow along in the analysis performed in the video. You should be able to use the free trial version of CapLoader and the free open source version of NetworkMiner to perform most of the tasks I did in the video.

Here are some of the BPF and Column Criteria filters that I used in the video, so that you can copy/paste them into CapLoader.

• net 10.0.0.0/8
• Umbrella_Domain =
• not ip6 and not net 224.0.0.0/4
• host 194.61.24.102 or host 203.78.103.109 or port 3389

References and Links

• Original writeup and capture file by James Smith
• CapLoader
• NetworkMiner
• Alexa top sites
• Cisco Umbrella 1 Million domain list
• Understanding user-agent strings
• Operating System Version
• Python SimpleHTTP web server
• coreupdater.exe on VirusTotal

Timeline

All events in this timeline take place on September 19, 2020. Timestamps are in UTC.

• 02:19:26 194.61.24.102 performs RDP brute force password attack against DC01.
• 02:21:47 RDP password brute force successful.
• 02:22:08 194.61.24.102 connects to DC01's RDP service as Administrator. Duration: 9 sec.
• 02:22:36 194.61.24.102 connects to DC01's RDP service as Administrator again. Duration: 30 min.
• 02:24:06 DC01 downloads coreupdater.exe from 194.61.24.102 using IE11.
• 02:25:18 DC01 establishes Metrepreter reverse_tcp connection to 203.78.103.109. Duration: 4 min.
• 02:29:49 DC01 re-establishes Metrepreter reverse_tcp connection to 203.78.103.109. Duration: 23 min.
• 02:35:55 DC01 connects to DESKTOP's RDP service Administrator (username in Kerberos traffic). Duration 16 min.
• 02:39:58 DESKTOP download coreupdater.exe from 194.61.24.102 using MS Edge.
• 02:40:49 DESKTOP establishes Metrepreter reverse_tcp connection to 203.78.103.109. Duration: 2h 58 min.
• 02:56:03 194.61.24.102 connects to DC01's RDP service as Administrator one last time. Duration: 1 min 38 sec.
• 02:56:38 DC01 re-establishes Metrepreter reverse_tcp connection to 203.78.103.109. Duration: 2h 42 min.

IOC's

• IP : 194.61.24.102 (Attacker)
• IP : 203.78.103.109 (C2 server)
• MD5 : eed41b4500e473f97c50c7385ef5e374 (coreupdater.exe)
• JA3 Hash : 84fef6113e562e7cc7e3f8b1f62c469b (RDP scan/brute force)
• JA3 Hash : 6dc99de941a8f76cad308d9089e793d7 (RDP scan/brute force)
• JA3 Hash : e26ff759048e07b164d8faf6c2a19f53 (RDP scan/brute force)
• JA3 Hash : 3bdfb64d53404bacd8a47056c6a756be (RDP scan/brute force)

Wanna learn more network forensic analysis techniques? Then check out our upcoming network forensics classes in September and October.

Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Friday, 09 July 2021 13:20:00 (UTC/GMT)

Tags: #PCAP​ #NetworkMiner​ #CapLoader​ #video​ #videotutorial​