NETRESEC Network Security Blog - Tag : Video

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Hunting for C2 Traffic

In this video I look for C2 traffic by doing something I call Rinse-Repeat Threat Hunting, which is a method for removing "normal" traffic in order to look closer at what isn't normal.

The video was recorded in a Windows Sandbox in order to avoid accidentally infecting my Windows PC with malware.

The PCAP files analyzed in the video are:

Thank you for sharing these capture files Brad!

IOC List

  • QBot source: 23.29.125.210
  • QBot md5: 2b55988c0d236edd5ea1a631ccd37b76
  • QBot sha1: 033a22c3bb2b0dd1677973e1ae6280e5466e771c
  • QBot sha256: 2d68755335776e3de28fcd1757b7dcc07688b31c37205ce2324d92c2f419c6f0
  • Qbot proxy protocol server: 23.111.114.52:65400
  • QBot C2: 45.46.53.140:2222
  • QBot C2 JA3: 51c64c77e60f3980eea90869b68c58a8
  • QBot C2 JA3S : 7c02dbae662670040c7af9bd15fb7e2f
  • QBot X.509 domain: thdoot.info
  • QBot X.509 thumbprint: 5a8ee4be30bd5da709385940a1a6e386e66c20b6
  • IcedID BackConnect server: 78.31.67.7:443
  • IcedID BackConnect server: 91.238.50.80:8080

References and Links

Update 2022-10-13

Part two of this analysis has been published: IcedID BackConnect Protocol

Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Friday, 30 September 2022 12:37:00 (UTC/GMT)

Tags: #Threat Hunting#PCAP#CapLoader#NetworkMiner#NetworkMiner Professional#Video#51c64c77e60f3980eea90869b68c58a8#IcedID#TA578

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Emotet C2 and Spam Traffic Video

This video covers a life cycle of an Emotet infection, including initial infection, command-and-control traffic, and spambot activity sending emails with malicious spreadsheet attachments to infect new victims.

The video was recorded in a Windows Sandbox in order to avoid accidentally infecting my Windows PC with malware.

Initial Infection

Palo Alto's Unit 42 sent out a tweet with screenshots and IOCs from an Emotet infection in early March. A follow-up tweet by Brad Duncan linked to a PCAP file containing network traffic from the infection on Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net.

Screenshot of original infection email from Unit 42

Image: Screenshot of original infection email from Unit 42

  • Attachment MD5: 825e8ea8a9936eb9459344b941df741a

Emotet Download

The PCAP from Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net shows that the Excel spreadsheet attachment caused the download of a DLL file classified as Emotet.

CapLoader download of Emotet DLL from diacrestgroup.com

Image: CapLoader transcript of Emotet download

  • DNS: diacrestgroup.com
  • MD5: 99f59e6f3fa993ba594a3d7077cc884d

Emotet Command-and-Control

Just seconds after the Emotet DLL download completes the victim machine starts communicating with an IP address classified as a botnet command-and-control server.

Emotet C2 sessions with JA3 51c64c77e60f3980eea90869b68c58a8 in CapLoader

Image: Emotet C2 sessions in CapLoader

  • C2 IP: 209.15.236.39
  • C2 IP: 147.139.134.226
  • C2 IP: 134.209.156.68
  • JA3: 51c64c77e60f3980eea90869b68c58a8
  • JA3S: ec74a5c51106f0419184d0dd08fb05bc
  • JA3S: fd4bc6cea4877646ccd62f0792ec0b62

Emotet Spambot

The victim PC eventually started sending out spam emails. The spam bot used TLS encryption when possible, either through SMTPS (implicit TLS) or with help of STARTTLS (explicit TLS).

Emotet spambot JA3 hash 37cdab6ff1bd1c195bacb776c5213bf2 in NetworkMiner Professional

Image: Emotet spambot JA3 hash in NetworkMiner Professional

  • SMTPS JA3: 37cdab6ff1bd1c195bacb776c5213bf2
  • STARTTLS JA3: 37cdab6ff1bd1c195bacb776c5213bf2

Transmitted Spam

Below is a spam email sent from the victim PC without TLS encryption. The attached zip file contains a malicious Excel spreadsheet, which is designed to infect new victims with Emotet.

Emotet spam email from PCAP

Image: Spam email extracted from Emotet PCAP with NetworkMiner

  • .zip Attachment MD5: 5df1c719f5458035f6be2a071ea831db
  • .xlsm Attachment MD5: 79cb3df6c0b7ed6431db76f990c68b5b

Network Forensics Training

If you want to learn additional techniques for analyzing network traffic, then take a look at our upcoming network forensic trainings.

Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Monday, 09 May 2022 06:50:00 (UTC/GMT)

Tags: #Emotet#C2#video#pcap#JA3#JA3S#51c64c77e60f3980eea90869b68c58a8#SMTP#SMTPS#Windows Sandbox

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How the SolarWinds Hack (almost) went Undetected

My lightning talk from the SEC-T 0x0D conference has now been published on YouTube. This 13 minute talk covers tactics and techniques that the SolarWinds hackers used in order to avoid being detected.

Video: Hiding in Plain Sight, How the SolarWinds Hack went Undetected

Some of these tactics included using DNS based command-and-control (C2) that mimicked Amazon AWS DNS traffic, blending in with SolarWind’s legitimate source code and handpicking only a small number of targets.

One thing I forgot to mention in my SEC-T talk though, was the speed at which the attackers were working to analyze incoming data from the trojanized installs and selecting organizations to target for stage two operations.

SolarWinds Hack Timeline

For example, just during June 2020 the attackers got more than 1300 new organizations that started beaconing in using the DNS-based C2. The beaconed data only included the organizations’ Active Directory domain name and a list of installed security applications. Based on this information the attackers had to decide whether or not they wanted to target the organization. We have previously estimated that less than 1% of the organizations were targeted, while the malicious backdoor was disabled for all the other 99% who had installed the trojanized SolarWinds Orion update.

SolarWinds C2 IP addresses

The attackers typically decided whether or not to target an organization within one week from when they started beaconing. This means that the attackers probably had several hundred organizations in queue for a targeting decision on any given week between April and August 2020. That's a significant workload!

Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Monday, 18 October 2021 10:30:00 (UTC/GMT)

Tags: #SolarWinds#SEC-T#video#backdoor#SUNBURST#Solorigate#STAGE2#Stage 2#DNS#C2#ASCII-art

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Start Menu Search Video

In this video I demonstrate that text typed into the Windows 10 start menu gets sent to Microsoft and how that traffic can be intercepted, decrypted and parsed.

What Was Sent?

The XML files shown in the video were sent by Cortana's "SmartSearch" app to https://www.bing.com/threshold/xls.aspx in HTTP/2 POST requests. As shown in the video, the POST'ed keystrokes can be found inside requestInfo XML tags that have a "RawQuery" key.

The following tcpdump and grep commands can be used to list the RawQuery data sent to Bing in these HTTP/2 requests:

tcpdump -A -r proxy-210927-134557.pcap | grep -a -o 'key="RawQuery" value="[^"]*"'

Running that command on the PolarProxy PCAP file from the video gives the following output:

key="RawQuery" value="n"
key="RawQuery" value="no"
key="RawQuery" value="not"
key="RawQuery" value="note"
key="RawQuery" value="notep"
key="RawQuery" value="notepa"
key="RawQuery" value="notepad"
key="RawQuery" value="s"
key="RawQuery" value="se"
key="RawQuery" value="sea"
key="RawQuery" value="sear"
key="RawQuery" value="searc"
key="RawQuery" value="search"
key="RawQuery" value="search .."
key="RawQuery" value="search ..e"
key="RawQuery" value="search ..er"
key="RawQuery" value="search ..e"
key="RawQuery" value="search .."
key="RawQuery" value="search"
key="RawQuery" value="search p"
key="RawQuery" value="search per"
key="RawQuery" value="search perm"
key="RawQuery" value="search permi"
key="RawQuery" value="p"
key="RawQuery" value="pr"
key="RawQuery" value="pri"
key="RawQuery" value="priv"
key="RawQuery" value="priva"
key="RawQuery" value="privac"
key="RawQuery" value="privacy"

The same data also gets sent in the query string variable "qry" of GET requests for https://www.bing.com/AS/API/WindowsCortanaPane/V2/Suggestions, as shown in this NetworkMiner screenshot.

Parameters tab in NetworkMiner
Image: NetworkMiner's Parameters tab with filter "qry" on "Parameter name" column

How to Intercept, Decrypt and Decode HTTPS Traffic

The following section presents the technical details regarding my setup, so that others can reproduce and verify these findings.

My first step was to install PolarProxy on a Linux machine on the local network. PolarProxy is a TLS proxy, which can intercept and decrypt TLS traffic. This TLS proxy is primarily designed to decrypt traffic from malware and hackers, but can also be used to decrypt legitimate traffic when needed.

PolarProxy was configured to listen for incoming TLS connections on TCP port 443 and output PCAP data with the decrypted traffic as if it had been transmitted over TCP 80. The decrypted traffic was accessible as a real-time stream through a PCAP-over-IP service running on port 57012. Here's the full command that was used to start PolarProxy:

sudo ./PolarProxy -p 443,80 --pcapoverip 0.0.0.0:57012 --certhttp 10080

In the video I showed the Windows 10 client's modified hosts file, which included an entry for www.bing.com pointing to the PolarProxy machine. What was not shown in the video though, is that PolarProxy's own CA certificate had been added to the Win10 machine's list of trusted root CA's, as explained in the "Trusting the PolarProxy root CA" section of the PolarProxy installation instructions. With these two changes in place all HTTPS requests for www.bing.com from the Win10 PC got diverted through the PolarProxy TLS inspection service, which then decrypted and re-encrypted the traffic before forwarding it to Bing.

The decrypted Bing requests could be accessed either locally on the Linux machine, or remotely using the PCAP-over-IP service on TCP port 57012. I used NetworkMiner to read the live PCAP stream with decrypted traffic from port 57012 and extract all files being sent and received in real-time.

Is it Possible to Disable the Cortana Search?

When Ars Technica reporters asked Microsoft back in 2015 if there was any way to disable this communication, Microsoft replied with the following statement:

As part of delivering Windows 10 as a service, updates may be delivered to provide ongoing new features to Bing search, such as new visual layouts, styles and search code. No query or search usage data is sent to Microsoft, in accordance with the customer's chosen privacy settings.

There are plenty of how-to guides online with instructions on how the Cortana search feature can be disabled. Most of these guides suggest disabling the AllowCortana setting in group policies or in the registry. We've tried several of the settings suggested in these how-to guides, but none of them seem to prevent Windows from sending keystrokes to Bing.

If you know how to successfully disable Cortana's Bing searches, then please feel free to reach out to us so that we can update this blog post.

UPDATE 210928 - How to Actually Disable Cortana Search

Twitter user @GeorgeProfonde3 reached out to suggest a fix that might prevent the start menu from sending data to Bing. We have now verified this fix and we're happy to announce that it works (at least for us).

  1. Start regedit.exe
  2. Open the following registry key:
    HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Search
  3. Ensure that the value for CortanaConsent is set to 0
  4. Create a new DWORD registry entry called "BingSearchEnabled" with value 0

You should no longer see any connections to www.bing.com when interacting with the start menu after implementing this fix.

UPDATE 211015 - Another way to Disable Cortana Search

You may need to use a different method to disable the start meny search, depending on your Windows version and build. Kimberly (@StopMalvertisin) suggested the following method, which seems to work on Windows 11:

  1. Start regedit.exe
  2. Create a registry key for:
    HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer
  3. Create a new DWORD registry entry called "DisableSearchBoxSuggestions" with value 1

Disabling Start Menu Search from Group Policy

There are also a few different methods for disabling start menu searches using GPO. However, please note that your success will vary depending on your Windows version and build.

GPO Method #1

  1. Start gpedit.msc
  2. Open the following branch:
    User configuration\Administrative templates\Windows components\File Explorer
  3. Enable the following group policy:
    "Turn off display of recent search entries in the File Explorer search box"

GPO Method #2

  • Start gpedit.msc
  • Open the following branch:
    User Configuration\Administrative Templates\Start Menu and Taskbar
  • Enable the following group policy: "Do not search communications"

Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Tuesday, 28 September 2021 08:24:00 (UTC/GMT)

Tags: #PCAP#NetworkMiner#PolarProxy#Microsoft#video#videotutorial#pcapoverip#PCAP-over-IP#HTTP/2#http2

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Walkthrough of DFIR Madness PCAP

I recently came across a fantastic digital forensics dataset at dfirmadness.com, which was created by James Smith. There is a case called The Stolen Szechuan Sauce on this website that includes forensic artifacts like disk images, memory dumps and a PCAP file (well, pcap-ng actually). In this video I demonstrate how I analyzed the capture file case001.pcap from this case.

Follow Along in the Analysis

Please feel free to follow along in the analysis performed in the video. You should be able to use the free trial version of CapLoader and the free open source version of NetworkMiner to perform most of the tasks I did in the video.

Here are some of the BPF and Column Criteria filters that I used in the video, so that you can copy/paste them into CapLoader.

  • net 10.0.0.0/8
  • Umbrella_Domain =
  • not ip6 and not net 224.0.0.0/4
  • host 194.61.24.102 or host 203.78.103.109 or port 3389

ASCII Network Flow Chart

References and Links

Timeline

All events in this timeline take place on September 19, 2020. Timestamps are in UTC.

  • 02:19:26 194.61.24.102 performs RDP brute force password attack against DC01.
  • 02:21:47 RDP password brute force successful.
  • 02:22:08 194.61.24.102 connects to DC01's RDP service as Administrator. Duration: 9 sec.
  • 02:22:36 194.61.24.102 connects to DC01's RDP service as Administrator again. Duration: 30 min.
  • 02:24:06 DC01 downloads coreupdater.exe from 194.61.24.102 using IE11.
  • 02:25:18 DC01 establishes Metrepreter reverse_tcp connection to 203.78.103.109. Duration: 4 min.
  • 02:29:49 DC01 re-establishes Metrepreter reverse_tcp connection to 203.78.103.109. Duration: 23 min.
  • 02:35:55 DC01 connects to DESKTOP's RDP service Administrator (username in Kerberos traffic). Duration 16 min.
  • 02:39:58 DESKTOP download coreupdater.exe from 194.61.24.102 using MS Edge.
  • 02:40:49 DESKTOP establishes Metrepreter reverse_tcp connection to 203.78.103.109. Duration: 2h 58 min.
  • 02:56:03 194.61.24.102 connects to DC01's RDP service as Administrator one last time. Duration: 1 min 38 sec.
  • 02:56:38 DC01 re-establishes Metrepreter reverse_tcp connection to 203.78.103.109. Duration: 2h 42 min.

IOC's

  • IP : 194.61.24.102 (Attacker)
  • IP : 203.78.103.109 (C2 server)
  • MD5 : eed41b4500e473f97c50c7385ef5e374 (coreupdater.exe)
  • JA3 Hash : 84fef6113e562e7cc7e3f8b1f62c469b (RDP scan/brute force)
  • JA3 Hash : 6dc99de941a8f76cad308d9089e793d7 (RDP scan/brute force)
  • JA3 Hash : e26ff759048e07b164d8faf6c2a19f53 (RDP scan/brute force)
  • JA3 Hash : 3bdfb64d53404bacd8a47056c6a756be (RDP scan/brute force)

Wanna learn more network forensic analysis techniques? Then check out our upcoming network forensics classes in September and October.

Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Friday, 09 July 2021 13:20:00 (UTC/GMT)

Tags: #PCAP#NetworkMiner#CapLoader#video#videotutorial

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Detecting Cobalt Strike and Hancitor traffic in PCAP

This video shows how Cobalt Strike and Hancitor C2 traffic can be detected using CapLoader.

I bet you’re going:

😱 OMG he’s analyzing Windows malware on a Windows PC!!!

Relax, I know what I’m doing. I have also taken the precaution of analyzing the PCAP file in a Windows Sandbox, which just takes a couple of seconds to deploy and run.

The capture file I’m looking at is called “2021-05-13-Hancitor-traffic-with-Ficker-Stealer-and-Cobalt-Strike.pcap” and can be downloaded from here: https://malware-traffic-analysis.net/2021/05/13/index.html

CapLoader’s Services tab shows us that the connections to TCP 80 and 443 on 103.207.42.11 are very periodic, with a detected period of exactly 1 minute. CapLoader successfully identifies the protocols for these two services as Cobalt Strike over HTTP and Cobalt Strike over SSL, respectively. The third service in this list is also very periodic, that’s the Hancitor trojan beaconing to its C2 server every two minutes.

Services tab in CapLoader

CapLoader uses machine learning to identify the application layer protocol based on the behavior of the traffic, not the port number. This means that there can be false positives, i.e. the protocol classification that CapLoader gives a flow or service might be wrong. It is more common, however, for CapLoader to yield false negatives, which means that it can't identify the protocol. The detection of Cobalt Strike inside of HTTP and SSL traffic was recently introduced in the latest 1.9 release of CapLoader. I expected this feature to detect Cobalt Strike traffic in HTTP, but I was delighted to see that CapLoader often detects even TLS encrypted Cobalt Strike beaconing with really good precision!

As shown in the video, the Cobalt Strike beacon config can easily be extracted from the network traffic using NetworkMiner and Didier Stevens’ 1768 K python script.

The output from Didier’s 7868.py tool looks something like this:

0x0001 payload type 0 windows-beacon_http-reverse_http
0x0002 port 80
0x0003 sleeptime 60000
0x0004 maxgetsize 1048576
0x0005 jitter 0
0x0007 publickey 30819f30[...]
0x0008 server,get-uri '103.207.42.11,/ca'
[...]

As you can see, it uses HTTP for transport with a “sleeptime” of 1 minute (60000 ms) and 0% jitter. This means that a new connection will be made to the Cobalt Strike C2 server every minute. The fact that there was no jitter is what gives this service such a high value in CapLoader’s “Periodicity” column.

Network Forensics Training

Are you interested in learning more about how to analyze network traffic from Cobalt Strike and other backdoors, malware and hacker tools? Then take a look at the live online network forensics classes I will be teaching in September and October!

Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Monday, 31 May 2021 08:30:00 (UTC/GMT)

Tags: #Netresec#Cobalt Strike#CobaltStrike#periodicity#Protocol Identification#PIPI#CapLoader#1768.py#Windows Sandbox#PCAP#NSM#video#videotutorial

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Sharing a PCAP with Decrypted HTTPS

Modern malware and botnet C2 protocols use TLS encryption in order to blend in with "normal" web traffic, sometimes even using legitimate services like Twitter or Instagram.

I did a live demo at the CS3Sthlm conference last year, titled "TLS Interception and Decryption", where I showed how TLS interception can be used to decrypt and analyze malicious HTTPS network traffic. During the demo I used DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) and posted messages to Pastebin and Twitter, pretending to be a malware or malicious actor. The HTTPS network traffic was decrypted and analyzed live as part of my demo. The CS3Sthlm organizers have posted a video recording of the live demo on YouTube.

Erik presenting PolarProxy at CS3Sthlm, photo credit: CS3Sthlm

Image: Erik demoing TLS Interception and Decryption at CS3Sthlm 2019

We are now releasing a PCAP file with the decrypted network traffic captured during this live demo here:

» https://www.netresec.com/files/proxy-191023-091924.pcap «

This blog post provides a step-by-step walk-through of the decrypted HTTPS traffic in the released capture file.

The TLS decryption was performed by connecting a laptop to a custom WiFi access point, which was a Raspberry Pi configured as in our "Raspberry Pi WiFi Access Point with TLS Inspection" blog post. I additionally enabled the PCAP-over-IP feature in PolarProxy by starting it with the "--pcapoverip 57012" option. This allowed me to connect with Wireshark and NetworkMiner to TCP port 57012 on the TLS proxy and stream the decrypted traffic in order to perform live network traffic analysis.

Laptop, Raspberry Pi, PolarProxy, Internet ASCII

Image: Live demo network with Laptop (Browser, NetworkMiner, Wireshark), Raspberry Pi (PolarProxy) and the Internet.

Below follows a breakdown of various significant events of my demo and where you can find these events in the released capture file.

DNS lookup of "www.google.com" using DoH

  • Frame: 833
  • Protocol: DoH using HTTP/2 POST
  • Five tuple: 192.168.4.20:52694 104.16.248.249:80 TCP
DoH lookup of www.google.com shown in NetworkMiner DoH lookup of www.google.com shown in Wireshark

Google search for "tibetan fox psbattle"

  • Frame: 2292
  • Protocol: HTTP/2
  • Five tuple: 192.168.4.20:52716 216.58.211.4:80 TCP
Google search for 'tibetan fox psbattle' in Wireshark Google search for 'tibetan fox psbattle' in NetworkMiner

Tibetan Fox image downloaded from reddit

  • Frame: 3457
  • Protocol: HTTP/2
  • Five tuple: 192.168.4.20:52728 151.101.85.140:80 TCP
Image download from reddit shown in NetworkMiner

Orginal "tibetan fox" image downloaded from this reddit thread.

Tibetan Fox Remix Image HTTP/2 Download

  • Frame: 5805
  • Protocol: HTTP/2
  • Five tuple: 192.168.4.20:52769 151.101.84.193:80 TCP
Images downloaded via HTTP/2

DNS Lookup of "cs3sthlm.se"

  • Frame: 13494
  • Protocol: DoH using HTTP/2 POST
  • Five tuple: 192.168.4.20:52699 104.16.249.249:80 TCP

Images downloaded from CS3Sthlm's website

  • Frame: 14134
  • Protocol: HTTP/1.1
  • Five tuple: 192.168.4.20:52896 192.195.142.160:80 TCP
Images downloaded from CS3Sthlm's website

Data sent in HTTP/2 POST to Pastebin

  • Frame: 18572
  • Protocol: HTTP/2 POST
  • Five tuple: 192.168.4.20:52904 104.22.2.84:80 TCP
Data sent to Pastebin in HTTP/2 POST

The file "post.php.form-data" contains the data sent to Pastebin in the HTTP/2 POST request. Here are the reassembled contents of that file, including the "hello cs3 I am a malware" message:

-----------------------------54168074520069581482009826076
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="csrf_token_post"

MTU3MTgyMjg5OTFwcjBzODJaQ0NuUk9PT1B3ZTl0b20zdFg3ZkhXQ1R4
-----------------------------54168074520069581482009826076
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="submit_hidden"

submit_hidden
-----------------------------54168074520069581482009826076
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="paste_code"

hello cs3 I am a malware
-----------------------------54168074520069581482009826076
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="paste_format"

1
-----------------------------54168074520069581482009826076
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="paste_expire_date"

1H
-----------------------------54168074520069581482009826076
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="paste_private"

0
-----------------------------54168074520069581482009826076
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="paste_name"

malware traffic
-----------------------------54168074520069581482009826076--

Mallory80756920 logs in to Twitter

  • Frame: 24881
  • Protocol: HTTP/2 POST
  • Five tuple: 192.168.4.20:53210 104.244.42.65:80 TCP
Twitter credentials for Mallory80756920

Mallory80756920 posts a Tweet

  • Frame: 26993
  • Protocol: HTTP/2 POST
  • Five tuple: 192.168.4.20:53251 104.244.42.66:80 TCP

Mallory80756920 tweeted "Hello CS3! I'm in you!". The data was sent to twitter using an HTTP/2 POST request.

Twitter post in Wireshark Twitter post in NetworkMiner

Conclusions

A great deal of the interesting TLS traffic in the analyzed capture file is using the HTTP/2 protocol. This doesn't come as a surprise since more than half of all HTTPS traffic is using HTTP/2 nowadays (sources: server protocol statistics, client protocol statistics). It is therefore essential to be able to analyze HTTP/2 traffic if you have a TLS inspection (TLSI) solution in place. Unfortunately many TLSI products don't yet support the HTTP/2 protocol.

Wireshark was one of the first network traffic analysis tools to implement HTTP/2 support, much thanks to Alexis La Goutte. However, Wireshark's excellent "File > Export Objects" doesn't yet support extraction of files from HTTP/2 traffic. There are other ways to extract HTTP/2 file transfers with Wireshark, but they require a few additional steps in order to carve out the file to disk.

Luckily NetworkMiner extracts files from HTTP/2 as of version 2.5. In fact, we believe NetworkMiner is the first open source tool to support automatic HTTP/2 file extraction from PCAP.

Finally, I'd like to stress the point that modern malware use HTTPS, so you need to have a TLSI solution in place to analyze the malicious traffic. As the majority of all HTTPS traffic is using HTTP/2 you also need to ensure that you're able to analyze HTTP/2 traffic passing through your TLSI solution.

Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Monday, 13 January 2020 12:45:00 (UTC/GMT)

Tags: #HTTP/2#http2#DoH#TLS#Google#decrypt#HTTPS#TLSI#TLS Inspection#TLS Interception#PolarProxy#NetworkMiner#Wireshark#CS3Sthlm#CS3#Forensics#PCAP#Video

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Video: TrickBot and ETERNALCHAMPION

This video tutorial is a walkthrough of how you can analyze the PCAP file UISGCON-traffic-analysis-task-pcap-2-of-2.pcap (created by Brad Duncan). The capture file contains a malicious Word Document (macro downloader), Emotet (banking trojan), TrickBot/Trickster (banking trojan) and an EternalChampion (CVE-2017-0146) exploit used to perform lateral movement.

Network Diagram

Network Diagram

Timeline of Events

Frame Time (UTC) Event
825 18:55:32 Malicious Word doc [cosmoservicios.cl]
1099 18:56:04 Emotet download [bsrcellular.com]
5024 19:00:41 Trickbot "radiance.png" download
9604 19:01:34 Client credentials exfiltrated [200.29.24.36:8082]
9915 19:01:36 ETERNALCHAMPION exploit from client to DC
10424 19:01:51 Client sends .EXE files to \\10.1.75.4\C$\WINDOWS\
11078 19:01:51 Client infects DC with Trickbot via rogue service
14314 19:07:03 DC credentials exfiltrated [200.29.24.36:8082]

OSINT Links Opened

Tools Used

Network Forensics Training

Wanna improve your network forensics skills? Take a look at our trainings, the next scheduled class is on March 18-19 at the TROOPERS conference in Germany.

Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Wednesday, 23 January 2019 14:00:00 (UTC/GMT)

Tags: #TrickBot#Wireshark#CapLoader#NetworkMiner#videotutorial#video#Emotet#pcap#Network Forensics#ASCII-art

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2018 July

Detecting the Pony Trojan with RegEx using CapLoader

2018 February

Examining Malware Redirects with NetworkMiner Professional

Analyzing Kelihos SPAM in CapLoader and NetworkMiner

Antivirus Scanning of a PCAP File

Zyklon Malware Network Forensics Video Tutorial

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