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njRAT runs MassLogger

njRAT

njRAT is a remote access trojan that has been around for more than 10 years and still remains one of the most popular RATs among criminal threat actors. This blog post demonstrates how NetworkMiner Professional can be used to decode the njRAT C2 traffic to extract artifacts like screenshots, commands and transferred files.

A PCAP file with njRAT traffic was published on malware-traffic-analysis.net last week. After loading this PCAP file, NetworkMiner Professional reveals that the attacker downloaded full resolution screenshots of the victim’s screen.

Overview of screenshots sent to C2 server

Image: Overview of screenshots sent to C2 server

Screenshot extracted from njRAT traffic by NetworkMiner

Image: Screenshot extracted from njRAT traffic by NetworkMiner

The file “New Purchase Order and Specifications.exe” in this screenshot is the njRAT binary that was used to infect the PC.

A list of njRAT commands sent from the C2 server to the victim can be viewed on NetworkMiner’s Parameters tab by filtering for ”njRAT server command”.

njRAT commands

The following njRAT commands are present here:

  • CAP = take screenshot
  • inv = invoke (run) a plugin (dll)
  • rn = run a tool (executable)

Additional njRAT commands can be found in our writeup for the Decoding njRAT traffic with NetworkMiner video, which we published last year.

njRAT File Transfers

The “inv” and “rn” commands both transfer and execute additional code on the victim machine. The “inv” command typically transfers a DLL file that is used as a plugin, while the “rn” commands sends an executable file. These DLL and EXE files are transferred in gzip compressed format, which is why NetworkMiner extracts them as .gz files.

njRAT files extracted from PCAP

Image: Gzip compressed files extracted from njRAT traffic

This oneliner command lists the internal/original file names and corresponding MD5 hashes of the gzip compressed executables sent to the victim PC:

  • for f in njRAT-rn*.gz; do echo $f; gunzip -c $f | exiftool - | grep Original; gunzip -c $f | md5sum; done
  • njRAT-rn-260129030403.gz
  • Original File Name : Stub.exe
  • ca819e936f6b913e2b80e9e4766b8e79 -
  • njRAT-rn-260129030433.gz
  • Original File Name : Stub.exe
  • e422a4ce321be1ed989008d74ddb6351 -
  • njRAT-rn-260129030451.gz
  • Original File Name : CloudServices.exe
  • fcbb7c0c68afa04139caa55efe580ff5 -
  • njRAT-rn-260129031041.gz
  • Original File Name : Stub.exe
  • 0ae3798c16075a9042c5dbb18bd10a5c -

The MD5 hashes of the files inside the gzip compressed streams can also be seen on the Parameters tab in NetworkMiner.

njRAT file MD5 hashes

MassLogger

The “CloudServices.exe” executable is a known credential stealer called MassLogger. This particular MassLogger sample is hard coded to exfiltrate data in an email to kingsnakeresult@mcnzxz[.]com. The email is sent through the SMTP server cphost14.qhoster[.]net. See the execution of this sample on Triage for additional details regarding the MassLogger payload in CloudServices.exe.

IOC List

njRAT (splitter = "|Ghost|")

  • 58f1a46dba84d31257f1e0f8c92c59ec = njRAT sample
  • 104.248.130.195:7492 = njRAT C2 server
  • burhanalassad.duckdns[.]org:7492 = njRAT C2 server
  • 801a5d1e272399ca14ff7d6da60315ef = sc2.dll
  • ca819e936f6b913e2b80e9e4766b8e79 = Stub.exe
  • e422a4ce321be1ed989008d74ddb6351 = Stub.exe
  • fcbb7c0c68afa04139caa55efe580ff5 = CloudServices.exe
  • 0ae3798c16075a9042c5dbb18bd10a5c = Stub.exe

MassLogger

  • fcbb7c0c68afa04139caa55efe580ff5
  • kingsnakeresult@mcnzxz[.]com
  • cphost14.qhoster.net:587
  • 78.110.166.82:587

Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Monday, 02 February 2026 19:39:00 (UTC/GMT)

Tags: #njRAT #NetworkMiner Professional #malware-traffic-analysis.net

Short URL: https://netresec.com/?b=262adb9


Detecting PureLogs traffic with CapLoader

CapLoader includes a feature for Port Independent Protocol Identification (PIPI), which can detect which protocol is being used inside of TCP and UDP sessions without relying on the port number. In this video CapLoader identifies the C2 protocol used by the PureLogs Stealer malware.

The PureLogs protocol detection was added to CapLoader in the recent 2.0 release.

The PCAP file analyzed in the video is from Brad Duncan’s fantastic malware-traffic-analysis.net website.

Indicators of Compromize (IOC):

  • mxcnss.dns04.com:7702
  • 176.65.144.169:7702

Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Monday, 09 June 2025 14:26:00 (UTC/GMT)

Tags: #CapLoader #PureLogs #malware-traffic-analysis.net #PIPI

Short URL: https://netresec.com/?b=256a8c4


QakBot C2 Traffic

In this video I analyze network traffic from a QakBot (QBot) infection in order to identify the Command-and-Control (C2) traffic. The analyzed PCAP file is from malware-traffic-analysis.net.

IOC List

  • C2 IP and port: 80.47.61.240:2222
  • C2 IP and port: 185.80.53.210:443
  • QakBot proxy IP and port: 23.111.114.52:65400
  • JA3: 72a589da586844d7f0818ce684948eea
  • JA3S: ec74a5c51106f0419184d0dd08fb05bc
  • JA3S: fd4bc6cea4877646ccd62f0792ec0b62
  • meieou.info X.509 cert hash: 9de2a1c39fbe1952221c4b78b8d21dc3afe53a3e
  • meieou.info X.509 cert Subject OU: Hoahud Duhcuv Dampvafrog
  • meieou.info X.509 cert Issuer O: Qdf Wah Uotvzke LLC.
  • gifts.com X.509 cert hash: 0c7a37f55a0b0961c96412562dd0cf0b0b867d37
  • HTML Body Hash: 22e5446e82b3e46da34b5ebce6de5751664fb867
  • HTML Title: Welcome to CentOS

Links

For more analysis of QakBot network traffic, check out my Hunting for C2 Traffic video.

Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Thursday, 02 March 2023 12:43:00 (UTC/GMT)

Tags: #QakBot #QBot #C2 #Video #malware-traffic-analysis.net #ThreatFox #ec74a5c51106f0419184d0dd08fb05bc #fd4bc6cea4877646ccd62f0792ec0b62 #CapLoader #NetworkMiner

Short URL: https://netresec.com/?b=233eaa1


Detecting the Pony Trojan with RegEx using CapLoader

This short video demonstrates how you can search through PCAP files with regular expressions (regex) using CapLoader and how this can be leveraged in order to improve IDS signatures.

The EmergingThreats snort/suricata rule mentioned in the video is SID 2014411 “ET TROJAN Fareit/Pony Downloader Checkin 2”.

The header accept-encoding header with quality factor 0 used by the Pony malware is:
Accept-Encoding: identity, *;q=0

And here is the regular expression used to search for that exact header: \r\nAccept-Encoding: identity, \*;q=0\r\n

After recording the video I noticed that the leaked source code for Pony 2.0 actually contains this accept-encoding header as a hard-coded string. Have a look in the redirect.php file, where they set curl’s CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER to this specific string.

Pony using curl to set: Accept-Encoding: identity, *;q=0

Wanna learn more about the intended use of quality factors in HTTP accept headers? Then have a look at section 14.1 of RFC 2616section 5.3.4 of RFC 7231, which defines how to use qvalues (i.e. quality factors) in the Accept-Encoding header.

Finally, I'd like to thank Brad Duncan for running the malware-traffic-analysis.net website, your PCAP files often come in handy!

Update 2018-07-05

I submitted a snort/suricata signature to the Emerging-Sigs mailinglist after publishing this blog post, which resulted in the Emerging Threats signature 2014411 being updated on that same day to include:

content:"|0d 0a|Accept-Encoding|3a 20|identity,|20 2a 3b|q=0|0d 0a|"; http_header;

Thank you @EmergingThreats for the fast turnaround!

Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Wednesday, 04 July 2018 07:39:00 (UTC/GMT)

Tags: #video #regex #malware #IDS #curl #malware-traffic-analysis.net #videotutorial

Short URL: https://netresec.com/?b=187e291